The First Amendment Right of Access to
Civil Trials After Globe Newspaper Co. v.
Superior Court
In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia1 and Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,2 the United States Supreme Court
established that the press and public have a right of access to
criminal trials guaranteed by the first amendment.3 Although the
Constitution nowhere explicitly guarantees the right to attend
criminal trials, the Court reasoned that such a right is historically
rooted in our system of justice and implicit in the first amendment's "core purpose" of assuring free public discussion.5 In Globe,
the Court held that any denial of this right must be "necessitated
by a compelling governmental interest" and "narrowly tailored to
serve that interest."6
7
This comment argues that the constitutional right of access
announced in Richmond and Globe extends to civil trials." Civil
1 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
2 457 U.S. 596 (1982).

"Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or
of the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See Globe, 457 U.S. at 604; Richmond, 448 U.S. at 579.
B Richmond, 448 U.S. at 575. The Court has recently extended the right of access to
pretrial voir dire for the same reasons. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 104 S.
Ct. 819, 821-24 (1984).
6 457 U.S. at 606-07.
" Whether the right of access recognized in Richmond and Globe should include the
right to inspect and copy evidence, though related to the subject of the present comment, is
beyond its scope. Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to note in passing that many courts have
held that the principles mandating access to judicial proceedings also guarantee the right to
inspect and copy court documents. See, e.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C.,
710 F.2d 1165, 1177 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Carpentier, 526 F. Supp. 292, 294-95
(E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd on other grounds, 689 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
735 (1983). But see Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423, 426-28 (5th Cir. 1981)
(disallowing access to audiotapes played at criminal trial); United States v. Hubbard, 650
F.2d 293, 316-17 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Richmond does not undercut earlier conclusion of the
Court that right to inspect evidence is best left to trial court's discretion).
8 The term civil suit, as used throughout this comment, refers to any trial instituted by
complaint and not by prosecution through indictment or information. In Cox Enterprises v.
Vaccocu, 455 U.S. 994 (1982), the Supreme Court denied certiorari on a case raising the
question of whether pretrial hearings in a shareholders' derivative suit could constitutionally
be closed to the public. See Note, After Richmond Newspapers: A Public Right to Attend
3

Access to Civil Trials
trials, like criminal trials, have historically been open and concern
matters vital to the "free discussion of governmental affairs." 9
Moreover, a right of access to civil, like criminal, trials plays a "significant role in the functioning of the judicial process and the government as a whole." 10
Like the right to attend criminal trials, the right to attend
civil trials is not absolute, and may be restricted where necessary
to protect "compelling" governmental interests.11 The comment
will explore four such interests: safeguarding national security,
protecting trade secrets, ensuring the anonymity of juvenile offenders and witnesses, and safeguarding the rights of privacy. It will
argue that these interests are sufficiently "compelling" to overcome
the press's right of access only where an open trial would destroy
the right sought to be vindicated at trial or jeopardize the physical
safety of witnesses or parties. As in criminal cases, the need for
closure must be determined on a case-by-case basis, and any orders
mandating closure must be narrowly drawn.' 2
I. THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO CRIMINAL TRIALS: Richmond AND
Globe.
A.

Richmond: Conflicting Analyses

3
a defendant facIn Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,1
successfully
moved to close
ing his fourth trial on murder charges
1
the entire proceedings to the press and public. " Richmond Newspapers, whose reporter had been covering the trial, sought an immediate hearing to vacate the closure order.15 The trial court denied Richmond Newspapers's motion on the ground that closure
was necessary to guarantee a fair trial.16 The Virginia Supreme
Court, finding no reversible error, dismissed the newspaper's mandamus petition and denied the newspaper's petition for appeal.

Civil Trials, 4 COMM/ENT L.J. 291, 292 n.9 (1982).
9 Globe, 457 U.S. at 604 (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)).
10 Id. at 606.
1 Id. at 606-07.
12 Cf. id. (articulating a similar test for closing a criminal trial); Richmond, 448 U.S. at
581 ("Absent an overriding interest articulated in findings, the trial of a criminal case must

be open to the public.").
13 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
14 Id. at 559-60.
"BId. at 560.

16 Id. at 560-61.
27 Id. at 562.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[51:286

By a vote of seven to one, 18 the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the order violated the public and press's first
amendment right of access to criminal trials. No majority coalesced
to support a single rationale for this holding."
Chief Justice Burger, the author of the plurality opinion, relied primarily on historical evidence to support his finding of a
right to attend criminal trials, 20 and analogized the right of access
to the courtroom to the right of assembly in places, such as streets
and parks, that have been "traditionally open" to the public.2 1 The
Chief Justice also emphasized that a guarantee of access would
benefit society by increasing trust in the judical system. 2
In his concurrence, Justice Brennan emphasized the "structural role" played by the first amendment in "securing and fostering our republican system of self-government."2 3 Implicit in this
structural role is the principle that public debate should be not
only uninhibited, but also informed. 24 The right of access is properly a matter of first amendment concern because it advances the
"broadly political interests" of a nation committed to self-government and to "maintaining public confidence in the administration
of justice."2 Finally, Justice Brennan noted that openness im18Justice Powell did not participate, id. at 581, and Justice Rehnquist dissented on the
ground that nothing in the first, sixth, ninth, or fourteenth amendments authorized the Supreme Court to review state court decisions regarding trial closure, id. at 604.
19 Justices White and Stevens joined Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion, id. at 558,
but each also wrote a separate concurring opinion, id. at 582. Justice Brennan, joined by
Justice Marshall, concurred in the judgment and wrote a separate concurrence. Id. at 584.
Justices Stewart and Blackmun wrote separate concurrences. Id. at 598, 601. Numerous
commentators have discussed the various positions of the Justices. See BeVier, Like Mackerel in the Moonlight: Some Reflections on Richmond Newspapers, 10 HOFSTRA L. REv.311
(1982); Fenner & Koley, Access to Judicial Proceedings: To Richmond Newspapers, and
Beyond, 16 HARv.C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415 (1981); Note, Public Trials and a FirstAmendment
Right of Access: A Presumptionof Openness, 60 NEB. L. REV. 169 (1981); Comment, Is the
Right of Access to Trials an Instance of a First Amendment Right to Know?, 42 OHIO ST.
L.J. 831 (1981). Of particular interest is Note, supra note 8, which analyzes the right of
access to civil trials before Globe.

:0 448 U.S. at 569-571 (plurality opinion of Burger, C.J.).
21 Id. at 577-78. This rationale was also adopted by Justice Stewart. Id. at 599-600
(Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment). For criticism of this position, see BeVier, supra
note 19, at 328-31.
22 448 U.S. at 572 (plurality opinion of Burger, C.J.).
23Id. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis in original).
24 Id. Justice Brennan's theory appears to draw heavily on A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE
SPEECH AND ITs RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948). See Brennan, Address, 32 RUTGERS
L. REV. 173, 176-77 (1979) (discussing "structural" model of first amendment); Brennan,
The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretationof the FirstAmendment, 79 HARv.
L. REV. 1 (1965) (comparing Meiklejohn's views on the first amendment to those found in

Supreme Court opinions).
25 448 U.S. at 594-95 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
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proves the judicial process by serving to check abuse and promote
"accurate factfinding."28
Justices White and Blackmun each wrote separately to note
that the Court's holding would have been unnecessary had the
Court not earlier denied a public right of access under the sixth
amendment guarantee of a public trial.2 7 Justice Stevens read the
plurality opinion broadly to suggest that any "arbitrary interference with access to important [governmental] information" may violate the first amendment.2 8 Justice Stewart, concurring in the
judgment, emphasized that the right of access to trial proceedings
is "not absolute ' 2 and may be restricted to preserve courtroom
decorum s° or to protect asserted reputational and proprietary interests. 3 1 Such interests, Justice Stewart noted, need not be constitutional to justify denial of access.2
The multiplicity of views represented in the seven separate
opinions in Richmond left the newly established right of access
largely undefined. That definition was supplied the following year
in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court.
B.

Globe: The Importance of Function Confirmed

In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,3 the Supreme
Court clarified and strengthened the right of access announced in
Richmond. Faced with a state statute barring press and public access to criminal trials of alleged sex offenders during the testimony
of minor victims, the Court held the statute an invalid infringement of the first amendment right of access. 4 Justice Brennan,
writing for the majority,3 5 reasoned that the first amendment pro-

26 Id. at 596.
27 Id. at 581-82 (White, J., concurring) (discussing Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S.
368 (1979)), id. at 603-04 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) (same).
28 Id. at 583 (Stevens, J., concurring).
29 Id. at 600 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment).
30 Id.
31 Id. at 600 n.5.
32 Id.
33 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
84 Id. at 610-11. The case arose when Globe Newspaper Co. unsuccessfully attempted to
gain access to a rape trial conducted in Massachusetts Superior Court. Pursuant to MAss.
ANN. LAws. ch. 278, § 16A (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1980), the judge ordered the trial closed in
the expectation that two minor rape victims would testify. Globe's petition for extraordinary
relief to a Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts was denied. On appeal,
the full court dismissed Globe's appeal, concluding that the mandatory closure rule of § 16A
met the standards of Richmond. See Globe, 457 U.S. at 600.
35 Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell joined Justice Brennan's majority
opinion. Globe, 457 U.S. at 598. Justice O'Connor wrote a separate concurrence. Id. at 611.

290
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tection of speech serves to ensure effective individual participation
in "our republican system of self-government. 3 6 The first amendment therefore "embraces" a right of access to criminal trials in
order "to ensure that this constitutionally protected 'discussion of
governmental affairs is an informed one.' 37
C.

The Reasoning of Globe and Richmond

While in neither Globe nor Richmond did the Court purport
to establish a test for determining a right of access to all governmental proceedings, its analysis in Globe can be taken as a model
for determining whether a particular governmental proceeding
must be open to the public. The Court held that two features of
the criminal justice system explain why "a right of access to criminal trials in particular is properly afforded protection by the First
Amendment."8' 3 First, "the criminal trial historically has been
open. '3 9 Second, the right of access "plays a particularly significant
role in the functioning of the judicial process and the government
as a whole. ' 40 Once the right of access to trials is established by
reference to history and function, only a "compelling governmental
interest" can justify a denial of access. 41 The Court's treatment of
these steps-history, function, and compelling interest-will be examined in some detail.
1. The HistoricalAnalysis. Both Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion in Richmond and Justice Brennan's majority opinion in
Globe rely on the observation that the Anglo-American criminal
trial "has long been presumptively open. '42 This "uniform rule of
openness" 4 3 is important for two reasons. First, such a tradition
commands respect because "the Constitution carries the gloss of
history. ' 44 A right known to the framers of the Constitution might
have been thought by them to be among those rights not specifiChief Justice Burger, with whom Justice Rehnquist joined, wrote a dissenting opinion. Id. at
612. Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissent. Id. at 620.
36 Id. at 604; see supra note 24.
37 Id. at 605 (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)).
38 Id. at 605 (emphasis in original).
39 Id.
40 Id. at 606.
41 Id. at 606-07.
2 Id. at 605 (quoting Richmond, 448 U.S. at 569). The Court also relied primarily on
the historical openness of jury selection proceedings in Press-Enterprises Co. v. Superior
Court, 104 S. Ct. 819, 822-23 (1984), to establish a first amendment right of access to voir
dire.
. Globe, 457 U.S. at 605.
44 Id. (quoting Richmond, 448 U.S. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring)).
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cally guaranteed but nonetheless protected by the Constitution. 45
Second, the uniform history of open trials suggests "'the favorable
judgment of experience.' 16 Open trials persist because experience
has proven that they work. They have therefore evolved into an
4
indispensable feature of the criminal justice systemY.
Globe suggests that in looking to historical evidence to support
a first amendment right of access, one must look to the history of
the functions served by a particular proceeding, and not merely to
the traditional openness of that proceeding itself. That pretrial
hearings were not open at common law, for example, is, under
Globe, irrelevant since the functions performed by such hearings
were originally served by trials themselves.4 8 By emphasizing the
functional nature of the proceeding, Globe suggests that history
may not be used as an absolute limit in determining whether trialtype proceedings must be constitutionally open.
2. The Functional Analysis. The Court in Globe also recognized the "institutional value of the open criminal trial.' ' 49 Public
scrutiny of the criminal trial "enhances the quality and safeguards
the integrity of the factfinding process, with benefits to both the
defendant and to society as a whole."' 0 The benefits to the defendant were catalogued by both Chief Justice Burger's plurality
opinion in Richmond and Justice Brennan's concurrence. Public
presence at the trial acts as a "check" on "possible abuse of judicial power," 5 1 aids in "accurate factfinding,"5 2 encourages witnesses
to testify truthfully,"3 makes possible the location of key witnesses
whose whereabouts are unknown to the parties, 54 and discourages
4" As Chief Justice Burger said in Richmond, "[t]he Bill of Rights was enacted against
the backdrop of the long history of trials being presumptively open." 448 U.S. at 575.
46 457 U.S. at 605 (quoting Richmond, 448 U.S. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring)).
47See Richmond, 448 U.S. at 569 (Openness "has long been recognized as an indispensable attribute of an Anglo-American trial.").
4 See United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354, 362-63 (5th Cir. 1983) (pretrial bail reduction hearing held presumptively open, despite lack of historical evidence of bail hearing
openness, due to the growing significance of such hearings in the trial process); United
States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 555 (3d Cir. 1982) (historical analysis found irrelevant in
determining right of access to pretrial suppression, due process, and entrapment hearings
due to the growing "importance of pretrial procedure to that of trial"); cf. In re Westchester
Rockland Newspapers, Inc. v. Leggett, 48 N.Y.2d 430, 440, 399 N.E.2d 518, 523, 423
N.Y.S.2d 630, 636 (1979) (noting that if access to pretrial proceedings is foreclosed, "most of
the work of the criminal courts will be done behind closed doors").
49 Globe, 457 U.S. at 606.
50 Id.
1LRichmond, 448 U.S. at 596 (Brennan, J., concurring).
52Id.
53 Id. at 569 (plurality opinion of Burger, C.J.), 597 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. at 596-97 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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biased decision making.5 5 The benefits to society are equally great:
5
open trials deepen public understanding of the judge's decisions, 6
heighten respect for the judicial process,5"7 and provide "significant
community therapeutic value"5 8 by allowing the public, in watching "the accusation and conviction" of criminals who have committed a wrong against society, to "satisfy [its] latent 'urge to
punish.' ""
The Court's opinion in Globe suggests that access to any particular governmental institution, to be constitutionally protected,
must be more than merely consistent with the institution's purpose; it must actively promote that purpose. The Court found that
access provides such functional benefit to criminal trials because
abuse is checked and the community's confidence in the judicial
system is enhanced where the public has observed the process of
justice being done. Public access to other governmental proceedings, Justice Brennan stated in Richmond, must serve analogous
functions before openness would be constitutionally mandated. 0
3. Compelling Interests. In light of the historical and functional support for open criminal trials, the Court in Globe held
that any denial of access to criminal trials must be "necessitated
by a compelling governmental interest" and be "narrowly tailored
to serve that interest." 1 This standard of "strict scrutiny"8 2 is a
familiar one in both first amendment" and equal protection analysis, 64 and underscores the significance of the right to attend crimi-

Id. at 569 (plurality opinion of Burger, C.J.), 595 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. at 572 (plurality opinion of Burger, C.J.), 595 (Brennan, J., concurring).
6 Id. at 570 (plurality opinion of Burger, C.J.) (quoting C. GOEDE, A FOREIGNER'S OPINION OF ENGLAND 214 (Home trans. 1822)); see also Globe, 457 U.S. at 606.
88 Richmond, 448 U.S. at 570 (plurality opinion of Burger, C.J.).
Id. at 571 (plurality opinion of Burger, C.J.).
40 See id. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("(T]he value of access must be measured in
specifics. . . . [W]hat is crucial ... is whether access to a particular government process is
important in terms of that very process.").
81 457 U.S. at 606-07.
62 Id. at 607 n.17.
'3 For example, content-based restrictions on speech will be upheld only if "narrowly
drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest." Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 103 S. Ct. 948, 955 (1983) (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70
(1981)).
In analyzing equal protection claims under the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme
Court has held that a government classification that impinges on a fundamental right or
interest or discriminates against a suspect class can be upheld only if justified by a "compelling state interest." See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1972) (state's interst in protecting fetal life becomes compelling only after the point at which the fetus is viable); Harper v.
Virginia Bd. Of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (law restricting right to vote must be
"closely scrutinized"); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (law restricting
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nal trials.6 5
When the state asserts a compelling interest to justify a denial
of courtroom access, it in essence asserts that the harms that
would result from disclosure outweigh the first amendment interest
of the public in obtaining information about the judicial activities
of the government." In Globe, the state argued that its interests in
protecting minor victims of sex crimes from trauma justified excluding the public during the minor victims' testimony.6 7 The
Court agreed that safeguarding the physical and psychological
well-being of a minor might be a compelling state interest in some
cases 8 but held that the Massachusetts legislature could not categorically require -closure of all trials in which minor victims of sex
offenses would appear as witnesses. Rather, the Court held, a trial
court must make a case-by-case determination that "closure is necessary to protect" the welfare of the minor victim.69
The requirement in Globe of particularized determinations in
individual cases has two aspects. First, no interest can be sufficiently compelling in the abstract to merit closure of every criminal trial in which it is implicated. The second aspect stems from
the Court's requirement that denials of access be "narrowly tailored. ' 70 A categorical rule of closure is by definition overbroad
since "the circumstances of the particular case may affect the sig7
nificance of the interest." '
Finally, while a history of openness may alone suffice
to support a constitutional right of access, a history of restriction will not

persons of Japanese descent from designated West Coast areas subject to "the most rigid
scrutiny").
"s Compare, for example, the "strict scrutiny" standard of the majority opinion in
Globe with Chief Justice Burger's dissenting statement that "we . . . need only examine
whether the restrictions imposed are reasonable and whether the interest of the Commonwealth override the very limited incidental effects on First Amendment rights." 457 U.S. at
616 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
66 Some commentators, analogizing the right of access to the right to exercise other first
amendment freedoms in public places, have argued that a presumptive right of access exists
unless government can "prove functional incompatibility between access and the proceeding
itself." J. CHOPER, Y. KAmIsAR & L. TRE, Richmond Newspapers: A PanelDiscussion, in 2
THE SUPREME COURT: TRENDS AND DEvELOPMENTS, 1979-1980, at 169, 170 (1981) (statement

of L. Tribe); see Note, The First Amendment Right to Gather State-Held Information, 89
YALE L.J. 923, 936-38 (1980) (arguing that citizens should have a right of access to government information unless access is incompatible with the state's providing public services).
'7

457 U.S. at 607.
Id. at 607-08.

Id. at 608; see id. at 611 n.27 ("[A] mandatory rule, requiring no particularized determinations in individual cases, is unconstitutional.").
70 Id. at 606-07.
11 Id. at 608.
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necessarily preclude a right of access. In Globe, the Court noted
that the right of access to criminal trials is based only in part on
the historic openness of such proceedings. "Whether the First
Amendment right of access to criminal trials can be restricted in
the context of any particular criminal trial... depends not on the
historical openness of that type of criminal trial but rather on the
state interests assertedly supporting the restriction. '72 This understanding of the use of history represents a significant departure
from Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion in Richmond. As the
Chief Justice pointed out in Globe, Justice Brennan's majority
opinion "ignores the weight of historical practice" by demanding
that trials "involving sexual assaults against minors" be presumptively open. 7s Although history may be used to assess the existence
of a public right of access, the Globe majority held that any restrictions on that right cannot be justified solely by a tradition of
closure.
II.
A.

APPLYING THE

Globe

TEST TO

CIVm TRIALS

The Historical Analysis

Both historical and contemporary practice support the recognition of a constitutional right to attend civil trials. The early judicial system of England was not rigidly divided into civil and criminal matters as is the judicial system of today. There is no evidence
of any real difference of authorities or procedure in the treatment
of civil and criminal matters until the tenth century, at which time
a number of serious public offenses were reserved for separate
royal jurisdiction. 4 The county and hundred courts, in which most
75
litigants pressed their claims, were courts of general jurisdiction.
Id. at 605 n.13.
Id. at 614 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
71 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 38 (2d ed. 1898 & photo
reprint 1952). Although the king's courts in this manner wrested away the criminal jurisdiction of the local courts, the royal courts themselves exercised both a civil and a criminal
jurisdiction. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 40, 47 (4th ed. 1931). Royal
jurisdiction over civil suits was supported by the fiction that "every cause for a civil action
in the king's court was an offense against the king, punishable by amercement [forced
pledge], if not by fine and imprisonment." 2 F. POLLOCK & W. MAITLAND, supra, at 572; see
also E. JENKS, A SHORT HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 53 (4th ed. 1928) (discussing how the civil
writ of trespass was founded on the fiction that any interference with possession was a
breach of the king's peace).
75 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 74, at 9. At the time of the Norman Conquest all
England was divided into either shires or counties. Id. at 6. The latter in turn were divided
into hundreds, wapentakes, or wards. Id. at 11. The high official of each hundred and county
would preside over most civil and criminal suits; only if the litigants could not receive jus72
73
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Attendance at these courts was compulsory for all freemen. 76 This
tradition of public adjudication continued after the centralization
of judicial power by the Norman kings7 7 and the growth of distinct
procedures in civil and criminal suits. 8 The itinerant royal justices, who administered the king's law throughout the land,
would assemble large public gatherings"0 for the hearing of both
civil and criminal matters affecting the king's peace.8 " Whatever
the differences between civil and criminal procedure,82 public attendance at trial does not appear to have been one of them.
Given this unitary history, it is not surprising that early commentators either expressly or implicitly regarded civil trials as necessarily open to -the public. Lord Coke speaks of openness as a
characteristic feature of the king's courts generally," and Blackstone explicitly notes that the "presence of all mankind" is an integral aid to the factfinding process in private suits. 84 More recent

tice in the local courts did they petition the king's courts. Id. at 9.
7' See Richmond, 448 U.S. at 565; 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 74, at 12; 1 F. POLLOCK & W. MAITLAND, supra note 74, at 42-43.
7 For a discussion of this centralization, see supra note 74.
78 For example, the Assize of Clarendon in 1166 established the jury of inquest, predecessor to the modern grand jury, as a special institution for the initiation and prosecution of
certain crimes. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 112, 428 (5th ed.
1956). The distinction between criminal and civil suits did not take hold until after the
Norman Conquest. See id. at 422.
11 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 74, at 49-51, 264-276; 1 F. POLLOCK & W. MAITLAND,
supra note 74, at 155-56.
80 At the Eyre of Kent in 1313, for example, Sir. H. de Staunton declared "the King's
will was that all evil doers should be punished after their deserts, and that justice should be
ministered indifferently to rich as to poor; and for the better accomplishing of this, he
prayed the community of the county by their attendance there to lend him their aid. .. ."
1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 74, at 268. The Eyre was the most extensive and important
of the commissions that empowered the royal justices to hear all pleas. Id. at 265.
' Id.
at 50-51.
'2 See T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 78, at 422-23.
8S [A]l Causes ought to be heard, ordered, and determined before the judges of the
kings courts openly in the King's Courts, whither all persons may resort; and in no
chambers, or other private places.. . . Nay, that judge that ordereth or ruleth a cause
in his chamber, though his order or rule be just, yet offendeth be the Law, (as here it
appeareth) because he doth it not in Court.
E. COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND 103-04 (1642).
4 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND* 372-73. The remarks of
Sir John Hawles, Solicitor-General in 1658, are in a similar vein: "[Tihe reason that all trials
are public, is, that any person may inform in point of fact, though not subpoen'd, that truth
may be discovered in civil as well as criminal matters." Remarks upon Mr. Cornish's Trial
in 11 T. HOWELL, COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1783, at
460 (London 1811). Other early commentators refer to the tradition of open trials in terms
broad enough to suggest that civil as well as criminal trials were presumptively open. See
Lilburne's Trial (1649), in 4 T. HOWELL, supra, at 1269, 1273 ("[AII courts of justice always
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cases and commentators note that public trials of both civil and
criminal matters are a longstanding s5 and conspicuous s" feature of
English justice. In the words of one British case, "the inveterate
8' 7
rule is that justice shall be administered in open Court.

The English principle of openness was carried over into American colonial law. The 1677 Concessions and Agreements of West
New Jersey, for example, provided that all citizens could freely attend "all publick courts of justice for tryals of causes, civil or criminal."88 A number of prominent state charters provided generally
for "open" courts.8 9

Most states continue to guarantee open trials constitutionally
or by statute.9 0 In addition, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
require that all trials "be conducted in open court"91 and that "the
testimony of witnesses . . . be taken orally in open court. '9 2 Finally, the Supreme Court has noted in dicta that civil trials were
historically as open as criminal trials.9 3

ought to be free and open. . .

.")

(London 1809).

85Scott v. Scott, 1913 A.C. 417, 440 ("[E]very Court of justice is open to every subject
of the King. . . . [T]his has been the rule ...
for some centuries .... ).
86E. JENKS & D. DAVIES, THE BOOK OF ENGLISH LAW 72-73 (5th ed. 1953).

Scott v. Scott, 1913 A.C. 417, 445 (referring specifically to civil trials).
" Concessions and Agreements of West New Jersey, ch. 23 (1677), reprinted in 1 B.
SCHWARTZ, THE ROOTS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 129 (1980). This document was subtitled
"The Charter or Fundamental Laws of West New Jersey, Agreed Upon," and has been
hailed as an early example of the notion of a binding written Constitution. B. SCHWARTZ,
supra, at 125.
89 See, e.g., Pennsylvania Frame of Government (1682), reprinted in B. SCHWARTZ,
supra note 88, at 140 (providing "that all courts shall be open"); Massachusetts Body of
Liberties (1641), reprinted in B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 88, at 80 (jurors "shall have libertie
in open Court to advise with any man" (emphasis added)).
90 For a list of state constitutional and statutory provisions regarding access, see 6 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1835 n.2 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1976); see also H. CROSs, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW, 328-36, 337-47, 379-86 (1953). Some state guarantees of openness are
broader than those of the United States Constitution. See, e.g., People v. Harris, 57 N.Y.2d
335, 347, 442 N.E.2d 1205, 1210, 456 N.Y.S.2d 694, 699 (1982) (New York guarantee in criminal trials broader than federal); In re Westchester Rockland Newspapers v. Leggett, 48
N.Y.2d 430, 437-38, 399 N.E.2d 518, 521-22, 423 N.Y.S.2d 630, 634 (1982) (public trial guarantee under New York law may be asserted by public in civil as well as criminal trials).
91 FED. R. Civ. P. 77(b); see also Tavoulareas v. Washington Post, 724 F.2d 1010, 101516 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (discussing the statutory presumptions of openness established by the
federal rules), reh'g granted en banc, No. 83-1688 (March 15, 1984).
92 FED. R. Civ. P. 43(a).
93 See Richmond, 448 U.S. at 580 n.17 (plurality opinion of Burger, C.J.), 599 (Stewart,
J., concurring in the judgment); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 386 n.15 (Stewart,
J.). But see Globe, 457 U.S. at 611 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("I interpret neither Richmond Newspapers nor the Court's decision today to carry any implications outside the context of criminal trials.").
87

1984]

B.

Access to Civil Trials

The Functional Analysis

At first blush, the public interest in attending civil trials may
seem less compelling than its interest in attending criminal trials.
In criminal trials, the public is itself a party; if the defendant is
convicted, the punishment will often be imprisonment at public
expense. As noted by Chief Justice Burger, a shocking crime may
trigger "a community reaction of outrage" which in turn calls for
"open processes of justice.""' Civil trials, by contrast, frequently
involve purely private disputes with little direct significance for
anyone other than the parties. Even where the state is a party, a
civil proceeding does not implicate the moral sanction of the public, and hence public concern and the need for openness may therefore be reduced.
To except civil suits from the open trial guarantee, however,
would defeat the goals of informed public discussion and self-governance protected in Globe.9 5 Many civil suits concern the "vindication of constitutional or statutory policies"9 6 the proper resolution of which is as important to the public as is the punishment of
serious crime. The federal government itself institutes more civil
than criminal cases each year.9 7 These, as well as other, civil suits
frequently involve "issues crucial to the public"9 8 such as school
desegregation, 9 prison reform,10 0 environmental pollution,101 and
corporate misconduct.102 Moreover, the impact of such suits fre-

Richmond, 448 U.S. at 571.

Globe, 457 U.S. at 604-06.
Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. R.v. 1281,
1284 (1976).
17 In fiscal year 1982, for example, the federal government filed 48,868 civil complaints
in federal court, but initiated only 32,682 criminal cases. ADMINsTRATvE OFFicE OF THE U.S.
CouaTs, ANNuAL REPORT OF THE DIRCrOR 4-5 (1982) [hereinafter cited as 1982 ANNUAL
REPORT]. The federal government was also a defendant in 26,905 civil suits during this period. Id. at 4.
" Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d 1165, 1179 (6th Cir. 1983).
" See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 386 n.15 (1979) (school desegregation
cases, among others, given as examples of civil cases affecting interest of public at large).
100 See, e.g., Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796, 800-01 (11th Cir. 1983) (court upholds
first amendment right of access to post-trial and pre-trial proceedings in a civil class action
challenging prison conditions in Alabama).
101 See Chayes, supra note 96, at 1284.
102See C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR

72 (1975) ("The public at large... [is] frustrated by apparent inability of the law to bring
corporations under rein, awed by the magnitude of the problems, [and] baffled by the mystique that surrounds the inner workings and influence of the corporation . . . ."); see also
Chayes, supra note 96, at 1284 (listing securities fraud, antitrust, and other corporate suits
as displaying in various degrees the features of public law litigation).
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quently extends beyond the parties to the public at large."0 3
Even where a particular civil suit does not directly affect the
public at large, the judiciary remains a branch of government and
its conduct of civil litigation is a matter "relating to the functioning of government, ' 10 4 a subject about which the public has a right
to be informed. The Court in Globe did not predicate the public's
right of access to criminal trials on its role as a party to the litigation. Instead, the Court emphasized that access to criminal trials
fosters the "free discussion of governmental affairs"' 5 and protects
the competence and integrity of the judicial process.1 0 6 A right of
access to civil trials also serves this protective purpose. 0 Because
criminal cases currently account for less than half of the caseload
in both federal and state courts, 0 8 limiting the right of access to
criminal cases would deprive the public of the opportunity to scrutinize much of the judicial process meaningfully, and the judicial
system itself would suffer. As noted in Globe, public presence at
trials aids accurate factfinding, 10 9 fosters an appearance of fairness, 1 0 and serves as a check on abuse.' These benefits are not
diminished simply because the underlying charge is civil and not
criminal.
103 See Chayes, supra note 96, at 1302 (relief in much public law litigation is not "confined in its impact to the immediate parties" but has "important consequences for many
persons including absentees").
104 Globe, 457 U.S. at 604 (quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. at
555, 575 (1980)).
105 Id. at 604 (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)).
10 Id. at 606.
107 See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d 1165, 1179 (6th Cir.
1983) ("In either the civil or the criminal courtroom, secrecy insulates the participants,
masking impropriety, obscuring incompetence, and concealing corruption."); see also In re
Iowa Freedom of Information Council, 724 F.2d 658, 661 (8th Cir. 1983) (extending the first
amendment right of access to contempt proceedings, which are partly criminal and partly
civil in nature, enhances and safeguards the quality of the fact-finding process).
108 In federal court during fiscal year 1982, 206,193 civil cases were commenced compared to only 32,682 criminal cases. 1982 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 97, at 4, 6. The most
recent estimated figures for state courts show that in 1978, approximately 11,372,589 civil
cases were filed in all trial courts, compared to 8,804,329 criminal cases. NATIONAL CENTER
FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATIsTIcs ANNUAL REPORT 1978 at 38 (1983).
109 Globe, 457 U.S. at 606; see also Richmond, 448 U.S. at 596 (Brennan, J., concurring)
("[M]istakes of fact in civil litigation may inflict costs upon others than the [parties].").
110 Globe, 457 U.S. at 606.
"I Id.; see supra note 107. But see Rhinehart v. Seattle Times, 98 Wash. 2d 226, 253,
654 P.2d 673, 688 (1982) (suggesting that "the functioning of the adversary system plays an
important role in avoiding abuses in civil proceedings" without indicating why the adversarial process functions less scrupulously in criminal than in civil trials), cert. granted, 104
S. Ct. 64 (1983).
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III. COMPETING INTERESTS

Once one concludes, on the basis of both history and function,
that civil trials are presumptively open, any denial of the right of
access to such trials "must be necessitated by a compelling governmental interest," and be "narrowly tailored to serve that interest."' At the very least, the state must show that the interests it
seeks to protect through closure can be protected only by closure. " ' Furthermore, the benefit that will accrue to the interest
asserted must outweigh the infringement of the right of the public
to have open courts.11

4

In Richmond, Justice Brennan pointed to

national security 1 5 and Justice Stewart noted the "preservation of
trade secrets" 1 6 as two state interests that might justify public exclusion from portions of a trial in certain cases. Other potentially
sufficient interests include the protection of juveniles 7 and the
preservation of personal privacy,11 8 interests that are frequently asserted to justify closure of civil or criminal trials.' 9 As the Court
noted in Globe, however, even interests that are frequently compelling cannot support a categorical rule of closure.1 20 Given the
presumption of access, assertions of these interests must be considered on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the asserted interest is truly compelling on the facts of
a particular case and
21
whether less restrictive alternatives exist.
A.

The Interest in Protecting National Security
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that the gov-

112 Globe, 457 at 606-07.
11 Cf. id. at 609 (Requiring the trial court to make case-by-case determinations "ensures that the constitutional right of the press and public to gain access to criminal trials
will not be restricted except where necessary to protect the State's interest." (emphasis
added)).
114 Cf. id. at 606 (Only "weighty" justifications can override the presumption of openness in criminal trials.).
"5 Richmond, 448 U.S. at 598 n. 24 (Brennan J., concurring).

"I Id. at 600 n.5 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment).
"7

See Globe, 457 U.S. at 607 ("We agree with appellee that . . . safeguarding the

physical and psychological well-being of a minor . . . is a compelling [interest]."); Richmond, 448 U.S. at 600 n.5 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment) (The "sensibilities of a
youthful prosecution witness ... might justify [public] exclusion in a criminal trial for rape
118 See

infra notes 200-219 and accompanying text.
"I See 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 90, § 1835, at 445 (noting that most states sanction
closure in cases involving subjects such as rape or divorce or involving persons such as
minors).
10 457 U.S. at 611 n.27.

See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
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ernment has a compelling interest in maintaining secret those matters whose disclosure would prejudice the national security.'2 2 This
interest permits the government to close trial123 and pretrial 124 proceedings over the objections of a criminal defendant, to punish its
employees for violating contractual promises of secrecy,' 25 and to
shield sensitive governmental information from production in civil
6
1 2

trials.

The government's privilege against production of documents
containing national security information ensures that it will rarely
1 27
need to move for trial closure to protect such information.
Courts have traditionally given the "utmost deference' ' 28 to assertions of this privilege, and have refused to allow even in camera
examination of the evidence once, in the words of the Supreme
Court in United States v. Reynolds,' 9 a "reasonable danger" of
exposing national security information has been shown. 3 0 Where a
litigant seeks access to other types of sensitive governmental information, such as law enforcement information 3 1 or confidential executive communications, 32 the government retains only a "qualified" privilege against production of evidence. 33 Under this
122 See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,
448 U.S. 555, 598 n.24 (1980); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980); United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
123 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Lloyd v. Vincent, 520 F.2d 1272 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 937 (1975).
124 See, e.g., United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 991
(1972).
125 See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
12' See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
'127The national security or state secrets privilege can be broadly defined as a privilege
that "protects information not officially disclosed to the public concerning the national defense or the international relations of the United States." 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2019, at 158 (1970); see also National Lawyers Guild v. Attorney General, 96 F.R.D. 390, 401-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (privilege limited to military matters,
non-wartime foreign intelligence activities, covert intelligence sources, foreign liaison relationships, and intelligence collection methods).
128 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974); see Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1
(D.C. Cir. 1978).
12,345 U.S. 1 (1953).
130Id. at 10. For a persuasive argument that this standard insufficiently enforces statutory and constitutional constraints on executive activities, see Note, The Military and State
Secrets Privilege:Protectionfor the National Security or Immunity for the Executive?, 91
YALE L.J. 570 (1982).
See, e.g., Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1957) (informer's privilege);
United States ex rel. Lloyd v. Vincent, 520 F.2d 1272, 1274-75 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 937 (1975); Kinoy v. Mitchell, 67 F.R.D. 1, 5 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (ongoing domestic
security investigation).
See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974).
133 See Note, supra note 130, at 574-75.
131

132
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"qualified" privilege, a court must examine the information in
camera and balance the public's interest in disclosure against the
government's interest in secrecy before upholding the government's privilege.113
As a practical matter, resolution of the issue of privilege will
determine the need or justification for trial closure in most cases.
Where the privilege has been upheld, the unavailability of the evidence will render trial closure unnecessary. Conversely, judicial refusal to uphold the privilege ordinarily entails a finding that the
state's interest in secrecy is less than compelling. 13 5 As a practical
matter, then, a colorable closure motion could arise only in two
situations. First, where the court, in deciding a claim of qualified
privilege, finds the state's interest in secrecy to be compelling but
nonetheless outweighed by the litigant's need for production of relevant evidence, the state might seek trial closure as a secondary
means of protecting its secrecy interests. Second, the government
might agree to waive its evidentiary privileges on the condition
that the trial portions containing such testimony be closed to all
but the parties to the suit.13 6
Under Globe, trial closure in either situation would be justified
only if "narrowly tailored" to further a "compelling" state interest. 13 7 The court would need to inquire into the following factors:
the extent to which the information is, in fact, secret,13 8 the degree
to which the information concerns military or foreign intelligence
matters whose secrecy has traditionally been deemed crucial to the
public safety, 3 9 the extent to which the release of the information
would demonstrably impair the state's ability to function effectively,1 40 and whether a refusal to grant closure would impel the
See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711-12, 714-16 (1974).
For example, where the court applies the Reynolds "reasonable danger" standard,
finds no "reasonable danger" that disclosure might harm the national security, and hence
orders disclosure, see supra note 129-30 and accompanying text, the government's interest
in secrecy would appear far too speculative to be deemed compelling. Cf. Globe, 457 U.S. at
609-10 (state's interest in encouraging minor victims of sex crimes to testify deemed insufficient to justify categorical trial closure absent empirical support that closure in fact encouraged such testimony).
' ' See, e.g., Halpern v. United States, 258 F.2d 36, 44 (2d Cir. 1958) (closed proceedings preferable to denial of evidence in state secrets case).
137 Globe, 457 U.S. at 606-07.
13 Where the information has already been released to a nongovernmental litigant, for
example, the government's diminished secrecy interest may no longer justify excluding the
public from trial.
139 See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980); United States v.
Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953).
140 This inquiry is suggested by the requirement in both Globe and Richmond that or4

135
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government not to waive its evidentiary privilege.1 41 To ensure that
this inquiry is meaningful, however, representatives of the press
14 2
and public must be allowed to contest their exclusion.
B.

The Interest in Protecting Trade Secrets

Closing trial for the protection of trade secrets is a well-estab143
lished exception to the common law presumption of open trials.
The first courts faced with this question justified closure on the
grounds that certain types of commercial information1 44 were valuable only insofar as they were secret; 145 forced exposure of the
secrets at trial would therefore thwart the "justice" the court was
supposed to provide.1 46 Later courts framed this reasoning in terms
of adequacy of remedy:14 7 a plaintiff suing for trade secret misap-

ders permitting closure be based on particularized findings. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
141 This factor, of course, assumes that the harm to the public from closed proceedings
would be far outweighed by the benefit to the individual litigant who would otherwise be
denied justice. See Halpern v. United States, 258 F.2d 36, 44 (2d. Cir. 1958) (closed proceeding preferable to withholding needed information from litigant).
142 See Globe, 457 U.S. at 609 n.25.
143 See, e.g., Taylor Iron & Steel Co. v. Nichols, 73 N.J. Eq. 684, 690, 69 A. 186, 188
(1908) (in camera hearing allowed during discussion of manufacturing process);
Kaumagraph Co. v. Stampagraph Co., 197 A.D. 66, 73, 188 N.Y.S. 678, 683 (1921), aff'd, 235
N.Y. 1, 138 N.E. 485 (1923) (same); E. JENKS & D. DAviEs, supra note 86, at 72-73 (cases
involving trade secrets a recognized exception to the rule of open court).
I'l Most of the older cases concern mechanical or chemical processes. See, e.g., Herold
v. Herold China & Pottery Co., 257 F. 911 (6th Cir. 1919) (formulas for making fine grade
porcelain ware); Masland v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Powder Co., 224 F. 689 (3d Cir. 1915)
(processes used in making artificial leather), rev'd on other grounds, 244 U.S. 100 (1917);
Pomeroy Ink v. Pomeroy, 77 N.J. Eq. 293, 78 A. 698 (1910) (formulas for making ink); Taylor Iron & Steel Co. v. Nichols, 73 N.J. Eq. 684, 69 A. 186 (1908) (process for molding steel);
Kaumagraph v. Stampagraph Co., 197 A.D. 66, 188 N.Y.S. 678, 683 (1921) (heat-process for
printing fabric designs), aff'd, 235 N.Y. 1, 138 N.E. 485 (1923); Amber Size & Chemical Co.
v. Menzel, [1913] 2 Ch. 239 (secret mixture for amber size and grain size manufacturing);
Badische Arnilin & Soda Fabrik v. Levinstein 24 Ch. D. 156, 169 (1881) (considered question of in camera protection for formula dyes to be one of first impression). Customer lists
were also occasionally protected in this way. See, e.g., Witkop & Holmes Co. v. Boyce, 61
Misc. 126, 130, 112 N.Y.S. 874, 877, (allowing customer lists to be treated as trade secrets),
afl'd, 131 A.D. 922, 115 N.Y.S. 1150 (1908); see also infra notes 150-52 and accompanying
text.
145 "The property [interest] in a secret process is the power to make use of it to the
exclusion of the world. If the world knows the process, then the property [interest] disappears." State ex rel. Ampco Metal v. O'Neill, 273 Wis. 530, 533. 78 N.W.2d 921, 923 (1956)
(quoting Cincinnati Bell Foundry Co. v. Dodds, 10 Ohio Dec. Reprint 154 (1887)).
146 Scott v. Scott, 1913 A.C. 417, 443 ("[I]t would be the height of absurdity as well as
of injustice to allow a trial at law to protect [a secret] to be made the instrument of destroying the very thing it was intended to protect."); see also Badische Arnilin & Soda Fabrik v.
Levinstein, 24 Ch. D. 156, 169 (1881).
147 See State ex rel. Ampco Metal v. O'Neill, 273 Wis. 530, 540, 78 N.W.2d 921, 927
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propriation would be left with no effective remedy against persons
other than the defendant if the court disclosed the secret to the
public.
Because trade secrets cannot be preserved and hence justice
cannot be done in certain cases without trial closure, the protection of such secrets may constitute a "compelling interest" sufficient to justify at least partial closure of civil trials. 1 8 Given the
Globe requirement that any orders restricting access be "narrowly
tailored,' 1 49 however, it is important to scrutinize claims of trade
secrets strictly in order to avoid closing trials where disclosure of
the purportedly secret information would not work the competitive
harms trade secret law is intended to prevent.
The notion of legally protected trade secrets developed in the
private law context to remedy the unjust enrichment and competitive harm resulting from a defendant's misappropriation of commercially valuable information through theft or breach of confidence. 150 Early decisions addressing the protection of trade secrets
often distinguished between process-related information and information regarding "collateral matters of business confidentiality
such as pricing and sales volume data, sources of supply and customer lists."' 5 1 Many early cases limited the term "trade secrets"
to the former category.1 52 Recognizing that other forms of informa(1956).
148

While the broad principle is that the Courts of this country must, as between par-

ties, administer justice in public, this principle is subject to apparent exceptions....
But the exceptions are themselves the outcome of a yet more fundamental principle
that the chief objects of Courts of justice must be to secure that justice is done ...
[I]t may well be that justice could not be done at all [in trade secret cases] if it had to
be done in public.
Scott v. Scott, 1913 A.C. 417, 437.
"1 457 U.S. at 606-07; see supra notes 61-73 and accompanying text.
150 Connelly, Secrets and Smokescreens: A Legal and Economic Analysis of Government Disclosures of Business Data, 1981 Wis. L. Rav. 207, 230.
151 Id.
,5, Id. at 230-31. The most prevalent definition is from the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §
757b (1939): "A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of
information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain
an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it." For cases allowing confidential
business data such as customer lists to be treated as trade secrets, see Arnold's Ice Cream
Co. v. Carlson, 330 F. Supp. 1185 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Servisco. v. Morreale, 312 F. Supp. 103
(E.D. La. 1970); Inland Rubber Corp. v. Triple A Tire Service, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 880
(S.D.N.Y. 1962); Erone Corp. v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 22 F.R.D. 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1958);
Town & Country House & Home Service, Inc. v. Newberry, 3 N.Y.2d 554, 170 N.Y.S.2d 328,
147 N.E.2d 724 (1958); National Starch Prods., Inc. v. Polymer Indus., 273 A.D. 732, 79
N.Y.S.2d 357 (1948); People's Coat, Apron & Towel Supply Co. v. Light, 171 A.D. 671, aff'd,
224 N.Y. 727, 121 N.E. 886 (1918); Cupid Diaper Service v. Adelman, 27 Misc. 2d 1095, 211
N.Y.S.2d 813 (Sup. Ct. 1961). Prior to 1970, FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b), the predecessor of the
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tion such as customer lists also involve significant investments of
time and effort and that allowing competitors to misappropriate
such information would work the same kind of competitive unfairness as does release of process-related information, courts have
broadened the definition of trade secrets to include any commercial information usdd to obtain an advantage over competitors.1 5 3
In formulating trade-secret doctrines, courts and legislatures
have attempted to balance the interest in preventing unfair competition against the general interest of the public in the free flow of
information.1 5 4 This latter interest is particularly important where
a trade secret is involved in a civil or criminal trial. Therefore,
courts must be vigilant in ensuring that information that a party
seeks to exclude from public view through trial closure is, indeed, a
'legitimate trade secret.
Two recent suits illustrate the problems of lax application of
the trade secrets exception to court access. In Standard & Poor's
Corp. v. Commodity Exchange,1 55 information regarding Standard
& Poor's (S & P's) 500 Stock Index was held to be a "business
confidence," entitling S & P to close those portions of the trial and
to seal those portions of the transcript that described the procedures used in computing the index.1 5 Assuming, but not declaring,
the existence of a first amendment right to attend civil trials, 157 the
judge nonetheless relied on counsel's representation without conducting his own factual examination 8 and without giving the pub-

present Rule 26(b), afforded protection from disclosure only to "secret processes, developments, or research" and did not protect trade secrets or other confidential business information. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 890 n.41
(E.D. Pa. 1981). Nonetheless, federal courts protected such information "by analogizing
trade secrets and confidential commercial information to the types of information explicitly
covered by Rule 30(b)." Id.
15 Public Citizen Health Research Group. v. F.D.A., 704 F.2d 1280, 1289 n.25 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (quoting McGarity & Shapiro, The Trade Secret Status of Health and Safety Testing Information:Reforming Agency Disclosure Policies, 93 HAsv. L. Rzv. 837, 863 (1980)).
1" For a discussion of the public interest in the disclosure of business information, see
Connelly, supra note 150, at 221-229.
155 541 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
1
Id. at 1275, 1277-78. The case arose from a civil proceeding brought by S & P
against Commodity Exchange, Inc. for trademark infringement. S & P was allowed to introduce into evidence confidential internal management procedures regarding the preparation
of its 500 Stock Index in closed session. Commodity News Service then instituted suit to
gain access to the transcripts of the closed proceeding, arguing that the procedures constituted matters of "business confidentiality," which were insufficient to outweigh the constitutional right of access. Id. at 1274.
257 Id. at 1275-76.
15 Id. at 1277-78.
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lic or press an opportunity to contest their exclusion.15
In Tavoulareas v. The Washington Post Co.,16 0 the District
Court for the District of Columbia had extended to the trial"6 a
pretrial protective order governing confidential corporate documents of intervenor Mobil Oil Corporation,1 62 thereby withholding
the documents themselves from public view, 63 and permitted Mobil to excise portions of the trial transcript as "confidential" before
its release to the public.1 64 Although it acknowledged a possible
first amendment right to gather news, the court did not consider
the first amendment in its decision, nor did it disclose the reasoning behind its conclusion.1 6 5 Rather, the court in effect delegated
the task of deciding what documents merited secrecy to the party
resisting disclosure.
In both Standard & Poors and Tavoulareasthe court failed to
make the particularized inquiry that is a necessary prerequisite to
ordering trial closure. 16 A party in a law suit may have any number of reason for not wanting information publicly released besides
that information's commercial value. The information might embarrass individual employees, officers, directors, or shareholders, or
damage the reputation of the firm by casting doubt upon their
abilities, scruples, or actions; none of this information, however,
falls within the notion of a trade secret, and a party ought not,
159 Cf. Globe, 457 U.S. at 609 n.25 ("[F]or a case-by-case approach to be meaningful,

representatives of the press and general public 'must be given an opportunity to be heard on
the question of their exclusion.' (quoting Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 401
(1979) (Powell, J., concurring))).
160Nos. 80-3032, 80-2387 (D.D.C., filed Nov. 25, 1980). Tavoulareas was a libel suit

filed by William Tavoulareas, president of Mobil Oil, and his son, Peter, against The Washington Post. The jury verdict for the plaintiffs was overturned post-trial. See Tavoulareas v.
The Washington Post Co., 567 F. Supp. 651 (D.D.C. 1983). The discussion in text concerns

pretrial orders limiting press access to documents used at trial.
I'l Tavoulareas v. The Washington Post Co., Nos. 80-2387, 80-3032 at 3 (D.D.C. July 8,
1982) (order granting extension of protective order to trial) (on file with The University of
Chicago Law Review). On June 21, 1983, the district court unsealed the depositions subject
to this order, a decision that was reversed on appeal. See Tavoulareas v. The Washington
Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010, 1015 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g granted en banc, No. 83-1688 (March 15,
1984).
162 Tavoulareas v. Piro, 93 F.R.D. 24, 28-30 (D.D.C. 1981) (pretrial protective order
issued).
163Those documents not used at trial were recently resealed. See Tavoulareas v. The
Washington Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010, 1012 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g granted en banc, No. 83-1688
(March 15, 1984).
144 Tavoulareas v. The Washington Post Co., Nos. 80-2387, 80-3032, at 3 (D.D.C. July 8,
1982) (order permitting excision of confidential parts of trial transcript) (on file with The
University of Chicago Law Review).
165 Id.
'66For

the Court's requirement as stated in Globe, see 457 U.S. at 608.
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merely by intoning the words "trade L6secret,"
to be able to prevent
7
public disclosure of the information.

As a general matter, courts should examine in cameral6 e the
particular information for which a trade secret exception is
claimed. Furthermore, since the adverse party in the lawsuit is unlikely to have any particular interest in vindicating the public's
right of access, representatives of the press or the public should be
permitted to intervene
to contest the trade secret exception claim.
I
C. The Interest in Protecting Juveniles
All states have -statutorily created juvenile or family courts' 69
which generally exercise jurisdiction over delinquent, "incorrigible," and neglected children.

70

The subject matter jurisdiction of

these courts extends beyond juvenile conduct that would be criminal if committed by an adult,17 1 to noncriminal misbehavior of
juveniles, such as truancy,17 2 running away,173 "unruly" or "incorri167 See In re Iowa Freedom of Information Council, 724 F.2d 658, 662 (8th Cir. 1983)
(injuries to competitive position flowing "from customer or employee disgruntlement or
from the embarrassing publicity attendant upon public revelations" of unethical or illegal
conduct are subject to disclosure; Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d
1165, 1179 (6th Cir. 1983): ("Simply showing that the information would harm the company's reputation is not sufficient to overcome the strong common law presumption in favor
of public access to court proceedings and records.").
I" See In re Iowa Freedom of Information Counsel, 724 F.2d 658, 662 (8th Cir. 1983)
(courts should hold closure hearings in camera in order to protect the alleged trade secrets,
but the portions of those hearings conducted in camera should be as limited as possible).
Although the district court in Iowa Freedom of Information Council concluded that the
alleged items were in fact trade secrets on the representation of counsel, the appellate court
warned that more than mere representations must ordinarily be made. Id. at 663.
161 For a list of such state courts, see J. WIGMORE, supra note 90, § 1835(2) n.3.
170 See 47 AM. JuR. 2 Juvenile Courts §§ 23, 24 (1969).

171OFICE OF JUvENLE JUSTICE Am DEIQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEFT OF JUSTIcE,
STANDARDS FOR THE ADImn STRATION OF JuvENIL JUSTICE: REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADvisORY CoITE
FOR JuvENmE JUsTIcz AND DELINQUENCY PREVFNTON 247 (1980) [hereinaf-

ter cited as STANDmADS]. All states define delinquency to include conduct that would be a
felony if committed by an adult, but some states distinguish between delinquent and "miscreant," or misdemeanor, offenses. Other states specifically exempt violations of municipal
or other local ordinances from their definitions of "delinquency." Id. Delinquency adjudications in juvenile court resemble criminal trials, and will therefore not be discussed in this
comment. For an excellent treatment of access to juvenile delinquency proceedings, see
Note, The Public Right of Access to Juvenile DelinquencyHearings,81 MICH.L. REv. 1540
(1983) (arguing that the Globe standard should be extended to provide a public right of
access to juvenile delinquency proceedings). To the extent that any juvenile proceeding resembles a criminal trial, the argument for a comprehensive first amendment public right of
access is that much more clearly mandated by Globe and Richmond.
172 Truancy is included within the jurisdiction of the juvenile or family courts of 39
states and of the District of Columbia. STANDARDS, supra note 171, at 251.
173 All states currently provide for jurisdiction over runaways, either specifically or
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gible" behavior,'7 4 and to parental neglect and abuse. 17 5 The nondelinquency proceedings in juvenile court are generally civil in nature since they do not involve otherwise criminal conduct and since
the state's role is to attempt to assist the juvenile
in resolving his
76
status rather than to attempt to convict him.1
The majority of juvenile courts are governed by statutory requirements of secrecy in their proceedings and records. 177 The Supreme Court has held that states should strive to create juvenile
proceedings that are "intimate, informal [and] protective, ' ' 17 and
exclusion of the public from the proceedings has been justified as
serving the best interests of the child. 79 In excluding the public,
the state attempts to prevent immediate trauma to the child and
to protect the child's reputation against the lifelong stigma of delinquency or dependency. 80 Furthermore, informal and closed prounder the provisions covering children "beyond parental control." Id.
174 Some states entertain jurisdiction over disobedience to parental demands. Id. Most
states include incorrigibility in one form or another within the jurisdiction of the family
court. Id. at 252.
175 Most states provide jurisdiction over a child in neglect and abuse cases without requiring that harm or a threat of imminent harm be shown in order for the matter to be
cognizable in the family court. Id. A few states have statutes addressing the emotional neglect of a child, and Florida, South Carolina and Utah authorize judicial intervention for
failure of a child's parents to provide psychiatric help. Id. at 256. Most states provide for
jurisdiction in cases of destitution or make no exception in "failure to provide" statutes for
lack of financial resources. Id. A number of states currently include placement of a child in
unlicensed facilities as a ground for declaring the child neglected or abused. Id.
'17 About 15% of the cases filed in American juvenile and family courts are based on
"status offenses" such as truancy, running away, or incorrigibility. More than sixty-six percent of noncriminal misbehavior referrals are handled by intake personnel without filing a
petition. Nearly one third of all juveniles charged with noncriminal misbehavior spend time
in a detention facility and about five percent of those adjudicated are sent to juvenile institutions. Id. at 249-50 (citing D. SMrrIH, T. FINNEGAN, H. SNYDER & J. CORBEr, DELINQUENCY
1975: UNIrED STATES EsTimATEs OF CASEs PROCESSED wrrH JUVENIE JURISDICTION (1975)).
177 A list of these statutes is provided in Note, supra note 171, at 1540 n.3.
178 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971). In McKeiver, the Court promoted this version of juvenile proceedings by denying the right to a jury trial in delinquency
proceedings. But see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 25-31 (1967) (arguing that informality of juvenile proceedings is no justification for procedural arbitrariness).
179 J. WIGMORE, supra note 90, § 1835(2); see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1967)
(discussing claim of confidentiality in juvenile proceedings).
180 In his dissent in Globe, Chief Justice Burger decried as "paradoxical" the fact that,
under Globe, a minor victim of a sexual crime cannot be protected from publicity while a
minor offender can be protected under most state statutes. 457 U.S. at 612; see also Note,
supra note 171, at 1540 (arguing that the "paradox" could be resolved by permitting a public right of access to juvenile delinquency proceedings). While it is true that the victim has
done nothing to deserve any trauma, and therefore merits great protection, the victim, unlike the offender, usually will not be stigmatized by what has happened through continued
involvement with the state as a "delinquent" or "ward of the court." Because the purpose of
the juvenile courts is supervision rather than punishment for the acts of the juvenile's im-
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ceedings are also considered conducive to eliciting the truth from
the juvenile who might be frightened, or, conversely, overly impressed, by more formal and public proceedings.181
Since Richmond and Globe, however, secrecy requirements in
juvenile courts, at least where those courts are involved in delinquency proceedings, have been challenged as violating the first
amendment right of access.182 Juvenile proceedings, whether they
concern quasi-criminal or status offenses, are functionally similar
to trials and are subject to the same sort of procedural abuses that
openness in criminal trials forestalls. 8 " The Supreme Court itself
has noted the possibility of juvenile court misconduct: "Too often
the juvenile court judge falls far short of that stalwart, protective
and communicating figure the system envisaged. ' ' 184 Justice Brennan has also noted that while the juvenile courts are not bound by
all forms of due process, some forms are needed to protect the juvenile "against misuse of the judicial process."18 5 Without assurances that family court judges adjudicate with "parental" concern,
the public cannot trust in the quality of mandatorily closed proceedings, and a check on the system is necessary.18 8
maturity, the courts have an obligation to reduce this inevitable stigmatization as much as
possible. Closure, therefore, to the extent that it is justified in any case because of the involvement of a juvenile, may be more justifiable when that juvenile is an offender.
181 See In re Robert M., 109 Misc. 2d 427, 430 n.8, 439 N.Y.S.2d 986, 989 n.8 (N.Y.
Faro. Ct. 1981); J. WIGMORE, supra note 90, § 1835(2).
182 In In re Robert M., 109 Misc. 2d 427, 439 N.Y.S.2d 986 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1981), the
New York trial court held that a state statute which provided for selective exclusion of the
public from juvenile delinquency proceedings was constitutional under Richmond because of
the special state interests in preventing trauma and stigma of juveniles. The New York
statute permits a court to allow press access to juvenile proceedings only after the court
considers the likelihood of disruption, any objections of parties, the media's agreement to
avoid identification of parties or witnesses, the media's past behavior with respect to the
privacy of the proceedings, and the need for the orderly administration of justice. N.Y. FAM.
CT. ACT § 212 (McKinney 1975). The court, in upholding a denial of access, noted the Supreme Court's recent concern for juvenile court privacy and the particular need for such
privacy in this case, which involved a nine-year-old who had committed acts that would
otherwise be a crime. 109 Misc. 2d at 429-30, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 988-89.
183 J. WIGMORE, supra note 90, § 1835(2) ("No court of justice can afford habitually to
conduct its proceedings strictly in private. . . . The tendency to undue privacy should be
checked.").
1" McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 544 (1970); see id. at 544 n.4 ("A recent
study of juvenile court judges . . . revealed that half had not received undergraduate degrees; a fifth had received no college education at all; and a fifth were not members of the
bar." (quoting PRnsmEN1r's COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE JUsTICE, TAsK FORCE REPORT. JUvENELE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 7 (1967))).
18 Id. at 556 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
186 As one commentator has noted, "legal standards must be designed for a world that
includes both good judges and bad judges." F. ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF
ADOLESCENCE 71 (1982).
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Moreover, juvenile proceedings adjudicating cases of noncriminal misbehavior, neglect, or abuse raise issues of substantive concern to the community at large. The proper scope of jurisdiction
over noncriminal behavior is "one of the most hotly debated issues
in juvenile justice today.118 7 The intervention of the state into
family life, whether on the grounds of neglect, abuse, incorrigibility, or delinquency, is a constant source of tension in society, yet
the standards governing the threshold of intervention are still
largely undefined.""' Because adolescence is, as one perceptive
commentator has put it, "a period of semi-autonomy, it places special burdens on legal reasoning and public choice."1 89 The public
can choose effective means of assisting those juveniles "guilty" of
status offenses only if it is aware of the way in which these
juveniles are treated in family courts. Greater access to the family
courts, guaranteed by tests which limit judicial discretion to exclude members of the press and public arbitrarily, will help inform
the public's choice regarding the treatment of juvenile status
offenders.
The Globe test can be applied in those juvenile proceedings
that adjudicate noncriminal misbehavior, neglect, and abuse as
well as it can be applied to delinquency cases. As suggested in
Globe, mandatory closure of all juvenile proceedings should be regarded as impermissible.19 0 State statutes that permit closure are
constitutional only insofar as they entail a rebuttable presumption
of public access to the proceedings191 and permit closure only after

'87 STANDARDS,

supra note 171, at 249. Compare INSTrrUTE OF JUDICIAL AmiNSTRmA-

TIoN/AMEIUCAN BAR ASSOCIATION JOINT COMMISSION ON JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, STANDARDS RELATING TO NONCRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR (1977) (arguing that a system which imposes
the same sanctions for parental defiance as for armed robbery is unfair), with Arthur, Status Offenders Need Help Too, 26 Juv. JUST. 3, 5 (1975) (arguing that noncriminal misbehavior indicates that more serious trouble may be approaching and that the family court may
be the only place to prevent future crimes from occurring).
188 See generally Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: A
Search for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REv. 985, 1000-01 (1975) (Most statutes fail to
define "neglect" and therefore allow intervention into family life without the need to do so.).
For examples of controversial decisions regarding adolescent rights, see Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983) (holding unconstitutional a
state law which required, inter alia, that all minors under the age of 15 obtain the consent
of the parents before obtaining an abortion); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678
(1976) (striking down a New York law prohibiting the distribution of nonprescription contraceptives to children under 16 years of age).
1"I F. ZIMRING, supra note 186, at x (1982). For the author's brief discussion of status
offenders, see id. at 69-75.
1,0 See Globe, 457 U.S. at 610-11 n.27 (rule of mandatory closure respecting the testimony of minor sex victims constitutionally infirm).
"I Id. at 610; cf. id. at 608 n.22 (noting that no other state has a mandatory closure rule
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the judge has considered the public's constitutional right of access
and articulated a compelling state interest necessitating denial of
that right. 192 Even in cases that meet this standard, the proceedings should be closed only to the extent necessary to preserve the
compelling state interest. 19
Factors that a state might successfully assert as supporting a
compelling interest in trial closure include the extreme youth of
the child,9 proven psychological problems that would be exacerbated by public exposure, 95 or sensational facts that might subject
the juvenile to acute and long-lived publicity. 96 The focus of the
court should be on the protection of the particular child, not protection of the child's family, 19 7 the prior conduct of the press,"9 "
nor the threat of disruption to the proceedings. 199 These concerns
do not address the purpose of secret proceedings, which is to promote the best interests of the child, and therefore are not sufficiently compelling to deny access.
D.

The Interest in Protecting Privacy

Mandating public access to civil trials subjects civil litigants to
a waiver of their right to privacy whenever they seek to pursue a
legal remedy.20 0 Divorce suits are discussed here as a dramatic exfor the testimony of minor victims).
192 Id. at 610-11 n.27 (requiring particularized determinations in individual cases); see
also Richmond, 448 U.S. at 581 (plurality opinion of Burger, C.J.) ("Absent an overriding
interest articulated in findings the trial of a criminal case must be open to the public.").
M'Globe, 457 U.S. at 606-07.

19

See, e.g., id. at 608; In re Robert M., 109 Misc. 2d. 427, 432, 439 N.Y.S.2d 986, 990

(1981).

199 See, e.g., Globe, 457 U.S. at 608.

1
The gist of this factor is that if the court perceives a likelihood of notorious publicity, and believes that sparing the juvenile from it will deter him from committing more
criminal acts, then the state may have a compelling interest in closing that juvenile's trial.
'97 Both the New York court in In re Robert M., 109 Misc. 2d 427, 432, 439 N.Y.S.2d
986, 990 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1981), and the Supreme Court in Globe, 457 U.S. at 608, include the
interests of the parents and relatives of the juvenile among the factors to be considered in
ruling on motions for closure. The reasoning behind this consideration rests on a presumption that the child and the family are such an integral unit that, in order to promote the
best interest of the child, the parents' interest in secrecy must also be protected. Yet, this
presumption may not hold in every case. Particularly where the child will no longer live with
the parents after the adjudication, the parents' interest in secrecy does not seem sufficiently
compelling, at least alone, to deny the public access to the proceeding.
198 The court in In re Robert M., 109 Misc. 2d. 427, 429, 439 N.Y.S.2d 986, 989 (N.Y .
Fam. Ct. 1981), relied in part on prior press actions in closing the trial.
19 See id. at 429, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 988.
200 For a discussion of the effect of a right of access to civil trials on individual privacy
interests, see Note, supra note 8, at 311-14.
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ample of the humiliation and embarrassment faced by litigants
embroiled in legal disputes over personal matters.0 1 Some states,
out of concern for these privacy interests and in an effort to preserve public morals, have provided by statute20 2 or judicial decision 2 °s that public access to divorce proceedings may be denied.
The majority of courts20 1 have rejected this view. Such courts

have held that humiliation and embarrassment are insufficient interests to outweigh the benefits of open trials:
The hearing of a case in public may be, and often is, no doubt,
painful, humiliating or deterrent to both parties and witnesses,.

. .

but all this is endured because it is felt that in the

public trial is to be found, on the whole, the best security for
the pure, impartial and efficient administration of justice, the
205
best means for winning for it public confidence and respect.
Courts have also rejected the argument that divorce trials may
be closed to protect public morals, on the ground that it is "better
for the public interest" to conduct potentially scandalous trials "in
the presence of responsible portions of the community. ' 2s" The
public has an interest in open courts, despite the contrary preferences of litigants; courts "are not to be considered
as the private
0 7
domain of any person or group of persons."'1

101 See, e.g., In re Shortridge, 99 Cal. 526, 34 P. 227 (1893); State ex rel. English v.
McCrary, 328 So. 2d 257 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976), aff'd, 348 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1977); State
ex rel. Gore Newspapers Co. v. Tyson, 313 So. 2d 777 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), overruled,
English v. McCrary, 348 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1977). While disclosure of sexually intimate matters may of course arise in non-divorce litigation, see, e.g., State v. Schmit, 273 Minn. 78,
139 N.W.2d 800 (1966) (criminal trial for sodomy), those cases will not be discussed here.
202 See, e.g., IDAHO R. Civ. P. 77(b) (Supp. 1983); IOWA ConE ANN. § 598.8 (West 1981);
N.Y. JuD. LAW § 4 (McKinney 1983); UTAH ConE ANN. § 78-7-4 (1953). For a fuller listing,
see J. WiGMoPE, supra note 90, § 1835(1) n.2.
2o See, e.g., State ex rel. English v. McCrary, 328 So. 2d 257, 263 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1976), aff'd., 348 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1977).
104 In re Shortridge, 99 Cal. 526, 34 P. 227 (1893); State ex rel. Gore Newspapers Co. v.
Tyson, 313 So. 2d 777 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), overruled, English v. McCrary, 348 So. 2d
293 (Fla. 1979); McPherson v. McPherson, 1936 A.C. 177 (P.C. 1935) (Alta.); Scott v. Scott,
1913 A.C. 417.
1s

Scott v. Scott, 1913 A.C. 417, 463.

Williamson v. Lacy, 86 Me. 80, 81, 29 A. 943, 944 (1893) (action for trespass brought
against a magistrate who had plaintiff removed from a trial involving adultery). In State v.
Schmit, 273 Minn. 78, 139 N.W.2d 800 (1966), the Minnesota Supreme Court reached a
similar conclusion with respect to the disclosure, in a criminal trial, of sexual practices:
.'[T]he franker and more realistic attitude of the present day towards matters of sex precludes a determination that all members of the public ... may reasonably be excluded from
the trial of a sexual offense upon the ground of public morals."' Id. at 85, 139 N.W.2d at
805 (quoting United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919, 923 (3d Cir. 1949) (en banc)).
107 State ex rel. Gore Newspapers Co. v. Tyson, 313 So. 2d 777, 784 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
10"
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According to one early court, to hold embarrassment sufficient
reason to close trials would necessitate the closure of all trials,
since trials are inevitably embarrassing to someone.2 0 8 The same

court rejected the argument that fear of publicity would deter
timid litigants and witnesses from appearing in court, arguing that
publicity is recognized as a necessary part of the process. 09 Even
though a constitutionally rooted right in avoiding public disclosure
of personal matters has been recognized,210 it is unlikely that the
assertion of privacy can be sufficiently "compelling" to close divorce proceedings. 211 Under Richmond and Globe, the mere fact
that a constitutional interest is threatened by courtroom publicity
does not warrant a closed trial. 12 Rather, any denial of access must
be necessitated by a governmental interest shown to be "compelling" under the facts of the case at hand.213 Absent evidence that
public proceedings would subject the civil litigant to physical 214 or
acute psychological danger, 25 or would impair his ability to tes1975), overruled, English v. McCrary, 348 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1977); see also id. at 783 ("the
personal preferences of litigants and a fair trial for litigants are two entirely different considerations"); Scott v. Scott, 1913 A.C. 417, 438 ("[S]till less is it enough [to close a trial]
that the parties agree in being reluctant to have their case tried with open doors.").
208 In re Shortridge, 99 Cal. 526, 534, 34 P. 227, 230 (1893).
209

Id.

See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 457-460 (1977);
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); Tavoulareas v. The Washington Post Co., 724 F.2d
1010, 1019-20 (D.C. Cir. 1984), reh'g granted en banc, No. 83-1688 (March 15, 1984).
2 Indeed, Supreme Court cases indicate that first amendment interests of the press
and public will often override an individual's right of privacy. See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (holding that accurate publication of the name of a rape
victim obtained from judicial records cannot be punished as an invasion of privacy). In
Press-Enterprise, Co. v. Superior Court, 104 S. Ct. 819 (1984), the Court acknowledged the
possibility that a privacy concern might constitute a compelling interest sufficient to outweigh the public's right of access, but the Court did not indicate how the privacy concerns
and the right of access should be balanced. On the facts before it in Press-Enterprise,the
Court held that the privacy interest of jurors in avoiding public answers to embarrassing or
traumatic questions during voir dire might be sufficiently protected by allowing jurors to
answer particular questions in camera. Closing the entire proceeding was, therefore, unnecessary. Id. at 825. Two Justices, however, wrote separately to emphasize that the majority
opinion neither established a privacy right of prospective jurors, id. at 826 (Blackmum, J.,
concurring), nor diminished the public's constitutional right of access, id. at 829 (Marshall,
J., concurring in the judgment). As a result, the extent of any right to privacy and its relation to the right of access to other judicial proceedings, such as civil trials, remains as much
in flux after Press-Enterpriseas before.
212 See supra notes 61-71 and accompanying text.
2'3 See, e.g., In re Estate of Hearst, 67 Cal. App. 3d 777, 136 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1977)
(probate court permitted to seal probate files of William Randolph Hearst if the family
could substantiate their fears of physical attack by political groups).
:14 Id. at 784-85, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
15 In Globe, the Court recognized that preserving the psychological welfare of minor
rape victims might necessitate closure under particular circumstances. 457 U.S. at 607-08.
210
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tify,2 1 e the state's interest in protecting the privacy of that litigant
would appear too attenuated and speculative to meet the "compelling interest" test.
This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that the public has a
recognizable interest in the conduct of divorce litigation. The conduct of the judiciary is not of lesser public interest merely because
divorce trials involve highly personal and particularized situations.
To the contrary, divorce proceedings may call for heightened public scrutiny of the judicial process insofar as they make "extraordinary demands for compassion and sensitivity on the judge, the parties and the lawyers. 2 17 Moreover, the commonness of divorce
litigation creates a heightened public interest.2 18
Given the public interest in divorce litigation, trial closure
should only be allowed where necessary to the administration of
justice. 2 9 The desire to be free from humiliation, insofar as it
springs from the convenience and preferences of litigants and not
from the need to ensure effective testimony, is not sufficiently
compelling to justify even partial closure of divorce trials.
CONCLUSION

The constitutional right of access to criminal trials should be
extended to civil trials. Increased access to civil trials would beneAdults who must testify as to similarly humiliating experiences could conceivably suffer
similar harm. The state's interest in protecting both litigants and the public from open
testimony about sexual matters is reflected in the large number of state statutes allowing
discretionary closure whenever a trial involves "vulgar or obscene" testimony. E.g., ALA.
CODE § 12-21-9 (1975); see J. WIGMORE, supra note 90, § 1835(1) n.2.; see also Press-Enterprise, Co. v Superior Court, 104 S.Ct. 819 (1984) (discussing privacy interest of jurors subject to embarrassing questioning during voir dire), discussed supra note 211.
216 See Scott v. Scott, 1913 A.C. 417, 439 ("If the evidence to be given is of such a
character that it would be impracticable to force an unwilling witness to give it in public"
then closure may be necessary to ensure "the paramount object of securing that justice is
done . . . ."). Compare State v. Schmit, 273 Minn. 78, 85, 139 N.W.2d 800, 806 (1966)
("Mere embarrassment of adult witnesses with no showing of inability to testify" does not
outweigh a criminal defendant's right to a public trial.), with Kirstowsky v. Superior Court,
143 Cal. App. 2d 745 (1956) (closure appropriate where witness's embarrassment made him
unable to testify at all).
217 State ex rel. English v. McCrary, 328 So. 2d 257, 260 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976)
(Smith, J., concurring in part), a/I'd, 348 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1977).
'1 State ex. rel. Gore Newspaper Co. v. Tyson, 313 So. 2d 777, 785 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975), overruled, English v. McCrary, 348 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1977).
21 As the paramount object [of courts] must always be to do justice, the general rule as
to publicity, after all only the means to an end, must accordingly yield. But the burden
lies on those seeking to displace its application in the particular case to make out that
the ordinary rule must as of necessity be superseded by this paramount consideration.
Scott v. Scott, 1913 A.C. 416, 437-38.
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fit the public in several ways. First, public trust in the process of
civil litigation would be strengthened. Second, the public interest
in self-government would benefit from greater scrutiny of the judicial process. Third, the judicial process would itself be improved. A
right of access to civil trials is therefore essential to furthering the
first amendment's implicit protection of the public's right to be informed about the activities of government.
This comment has recognized that closure of civil trials must
nonetheless be ordered when necessary to protect compelling state
interests. Many traditional exceptions to open trials-such as the
need to protect national security, trade secrets, or juveniles-meet
this standard. The "compelling interest" exception is a narrow one,
however, and only permits closure where an open trial would be
incompatible with the process of justice or the state's obligation to
protect its citizens from certain injury. Adopting these guidelines
would ensure that the constitutional right of access to civil trials
will be meaningfully exercised.
Jeanne L. Nowaczewski

